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In the current debate on the reasons and implications of the Greek and Irish euro crisis, the 
intra-European current account imbalances have gained rising attention. Whereas Greece and 
Ireland struggle for austerity in private and public spending, Germany is urged to reduce its 
current account surplus by increasing wages to forestall a new build-up of unsustainable intra-
E(M)U indebtedness. We analyse the emergence of intra-European imbalances since the year 
1990 based on the theory of optimum currency areas. We show that the asymmetric shock of 
the German unification can be seen not only as the origin of the 1992/93 crisis of the 
European Monetary System, but also for the rising intra-European current account imbalances 
since the euro introduction and thereby the current European debt crisis. Based on this finding 
we argue that an increase of German spending to reduce its current account surplus is not only 
in the interest of German taxpayers to contain financial risk, but would also impose austerity 
on the rest of Europe. The resulting new wave of crisis could trigger a new round of monetary 
expansion in the EMU. 
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The Greek euro tragedy and the Irish debt crisis have revived the discussion on the optimal 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks in a heterogeneous currency area. In the current discussion, 
the benefits of macroeconomic stability (McKinnon 1963) and lower transaction costs for 
intra-EMU factor movements (European Commission 1990) have been  superposed by the 
costs  in  form  of  lost  monetary  policy  independence  as  an  adjustment  tool  to  asymmetric 
shocks (Mundell 1961). While one side has proposed Greece’s exit from the EMU to prevent 
a supranational transfer union (FAZ 2010a), the European Commission (2010) urges Greece 
to  impose  austerity  in  private  and  public  spending  to  cure  the  real  overvaluation  of  the 
disposed  Greek  currency.  To  prevent  further  imbalances  the  French  minister  Lagarde  has 
prompted  Germany  to  reduce  its  surplus  in  the  current  account  by  raising  wages  and 
consumption  (FAZ  2010b).  In  contrast,  the  German  chancellor  Merkel  highlights  the 
importance of exports for the German growth model.  
 
To analyse the consequences of the current policy propositions on the intra-European current 
account imbalances, we trace the origins back in the 1990s, when the German unification 
constituted an asymmetric shock to Europe. It will be argued that the legacy of the German 
unification  remains  an  important  reason  for  the  current  divergence  of  European  current 
accounts and thereby the current debt crisis. It will be shown that the adjustment channels of 
asymmetric  shocks  in  the  European  (Monetary)  Union  go  far  beyond  Mundell’s  (1961) 
seminal theory of optimum currency areas, extending to capital markets, fiscal policies and 
monetary policy.  
 
Based on this finding it will be argued that the French policy proposition to restrict German 
current  account  surpluses  is  in  the  very  interest  of  German  savers  and  taxpayers,  as 
international  risk  exposure  would  be  reduced.  However,  the  policy  tools  available  to  the 
German authorities to scale down the German current account surplus may be very limited 
because of the European institutional framework. Furthermore, if a reduction of the German 
current account surplus could be achieved based on expansionary wage and/or fiscal policies, 
this may not be in the interest of its neighbours. Such a reduction could impose austerity on 
the rest of Europe, unless, as the likelihood of a new wave of crisis increases, the European 
Central Bank may feel urged to engineer a new round of monetary expansion. 
 2 
2. Inter-Temporal Savings and the German Unification Shock 
 
The German unification is a textbook case for the advantage of inter-temporal savings in a 
heterogeneous currency area. Before the unification, West Germany traditionally generated 
large  saving  and  current  account  surpluses  through  its  highly  productive  export  industry 
(Figure 1). The resulting net capital exports led to a gradual build-up of international assets, 
inter alia versus its European partners. From the year 1980 to 1990 the net international assets 
of West Germany increased from 24 billion euros to roughly 250 billion euros as shown in 
Figure 2. When in 1990 the asymmetric unification shock hit, West Germany’s international 
assets could be repatriated to meet the immense financing needs to rebuild the new eastern 
part of unified Germany.  
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Source:  Eurostat,  Bundesbank  and  Destatis,  own  calculation  based  on  regional  national 
account figures.  
 
As a result, the current account balance of unified Germany switched from a 40 billion euro 
surplus in 1990 to a 20 billion deficit in 1991, while the West German current account balance 
further increased to a surplus of around 60 billion euros in 1991 (Figure 1). This implies three 
main macroeconomic financing sources of the unification: First, the current account surplus of 3 
West Germany increased. Second, the West German current account surplus was redirected 
from West Germany’s (European) trading partners towards East Germany. Third, the West 
German international assets were repatriated. German net international assets declined from 
250 billion euros in 1990 to close to zero in 1998 (Figure 2). 
 
The German unification shock constitutes for Europe a textbook asymmetric shock in the 
sense of Mundell (1961) as Germany boomed whereas the neighbours were in recession. In 
contrast to Mundell (1961), the shock primarily spread over Europe via capital markets (rather 
than goods markets). As over night German net capital exports were turned into net capital 
imports, German capital supply in European capital markets dried out and the German mark 
came  under  appreciation  pressure.  In  the  European  Monetary  System  of  the  early  1990s, 
which aimed to keep nominal exchange rates between the European currencies fixed, interest 
rates increased. The currencies other than the mark came  under depreciation pressure (Figure 
3) and the central banks (other than the Deutsche Bundesbank) lost foreign reserves. 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:  IMF.  Bilateral  real  exchange  rates  in  national  currency  per  German  Mark  are 
converted by national EMU entry exchange rates. 5 
This  process  was  further  compounded  when  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  tightened  money 
supply to contain inflationary pressure. Many European countries were dragged even deeper 
into  recession,  while  Germany  enjoyed  its  unification  boom.  EMS  members,  which  were 
regarded as unwilling to follow the German monetary policy stance – such as the United 
Kingdom and Italy – became victims of speculative attacks and currency crises. 
 
The  crisis  of  the  European  Monetary  System  was  resolved  by  realignments  of  the  EMS 
central parities and by widening the EMS bandwidths. In Figure 3 the real exchange rate 
against the mark is defined as national euros per German euros. The exchange rate alignment 
is clearly visible for Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. That solution fits to 
the textbook model by Mundell (1961) who argued that, given price and wage stickiness, 
exchange rate adjustments are necessary to cope with asymmetric shocks. Mundell (1961) 
also argued that the depreciation of the currency of the recession country is welcomed by the 
booming country, as the appreciation helps to reduce inflationary pressure. Indeed, in the 
short-term  the  appreciation  of  the  German  mark  contained  the  inflation  arising  from  the 
unification boom only partially.  
 




























Source: IMF. The real effective exchange rate also includes non-EU trading partners. 
 6 
Yet, Germany followed the United Kingdom and other European partner countries into the 
recession, as the demand for German products declined. The real appreciation of the German 
mark  –  which  was  caused  by  the  realignments  against  the  EMS-crisis  currencies,  rising 
inflation in Germany  and an appreciation of the German mark against the dollar (and all 
currencies  pegged  to  the  dollar)  –  became  a  drag  on  German  export  dynamics.  The  real 
appreciation of the German mark and wage increases beyond productivity increases eroded 
Germany’s  traditionally  strong  international  competitiveness  to  turn  the  German  current 
account  balance  negative  for  a  long  period.  This  trend  is  particularly  visible  if  the  real 
effective exchange rate of the German mark is calculated based on unit labour costs (ULC) as 
in Figure 4. When in the mid 1990s the turmoil of the German unification shock and the EMS 
crisis  had  settled  down  and  growth  in  the  European  Union  resumed,  government  debt  in 
Germany  (as  well  as  in  most  European  countries)  had  substantially  increased  (Figure  5). 
Germany had become plagued by the legacy of the unification boom in the form of high unit 
labour costs and high public debt. 
 



































































3. Intra-German Adjustment to the Unification Shock  
 
The economic consequences of the German unification process were not only perpetuated by 
a  Mundell-1961-type  asymmetric  shock  across  Europe,  but  also  within  Germany,  as  East 
German demand suddenly shifted from East German products to West German products. The 
political dynamics of the German unification did not allow for an adjustment via exchange 
rates as proposed by Mundell (1961). In the German monetary union, the nominal exchange 
rate for East German cash, bank deposits, wages and pensions was  fixed far  above the 
market rate at 1:1 and 1:2, respectively. By then, the market exchange rate between the West 
and East German mark was assessed to be at around 1:10 (Koedijk and Kool 1992).
1 The 
political decision in favour of the 1:1 exchange rate had been made in the belief that this 
would increase the East German standard of living in a timely manner (again to prevent large-
scale migration from east to west). West German politicians had made respective promises in 
the pre-election campaign in early 1990 (Tietmeyer 2000). 
 
Furthermore,  wages  were  not  fully  adjusted  to  divergent  productivities.  The  strongly 
overvalued entry of the East German mark into the German monetary union in combination 
with  lower  productivity  of  the  East  German  industry  would  have  required  a  substantially 
lower wage level in the eastern part of Germany. Because of the strong bargaining power of 
the unified German trade unions, wages in East Germany increased far above the level, which 
was justified by industrial productivity (to prevent large-scale migration from east to west).
2 
Furthermore,  rigid  West  German  labour  market  regulations  were  carried  over  to  East 
Germany, as trade unions pushed for a quick equalisation of working conditions.  
 
The  German  monetary  union  in  combination  with  wage  equalisation  required  alternative 
adjustment mechanisms. As in Mundell’s (1961) seminal theory labour migration from East to 
West as well as public transfers (explicit and implicit via social security systems) into the 
opposite direction (to prevent even more migration) became the most important adjustment 
channels. Until 2008 East Germany lost (in net terms) around 6 percent of its population, 
particularly due to migration to the western part of Germany. Within a completely integrated 
labour market and given a highly developed transport infrastructure, thousands of workers 
started to commute from east to west.  
                                                 
1 The estimation is based on a black market rate as the East German mark was not freely convertible.  
2 In 1992, East German wages reached 62 percent of the West German wage level (Brenke 2001) and meanwhile 
converged to about 80 percent (Ragnitz 2010).  8 
The public transfers for East Germany consist of payments for extraordinary burden related to 
the  German  unification  (Solidarpakt  I+II)  and  payments  via  the  German  regional  tax 
equalisation system (Länderfinanzausgleich) (BMF 2010). In total since 1990, transfers from 
West to East are estimated at  about 15 to 17 billion euros annually. Transfers corresponded to 
more than 20 percent of the current aggregated public budgets of East German federal states 
in 2008.
3 Additionally to the outright transfers, implicit transfers arose from the adoption of 
the West German social security system in East Germany. In Figure 6 overall net transfers 
(private and public) are approximated by the East German current account balance. Based on 
this proxy, by 1990 net transfers constituted almost 50% of East German output. Although net 
transfers gradually declined to less than 10% of East German output, the persistence of public 
transfer  flows  remains  a  source  of  discomfort  in  the  western  part  of  Germany,  which 
generates the largest share of German tax revenues.  All in all, the overall volume of net 
transfers from West to East Germany is estimated to sum up to 1300 billions euros between 
1991 and 2009.       
 


























Source: Destatis, own calculations based on regional national account figures.   
 
                                                 
3 Data are collected from online statistics of the Bundesfinanzministerium and Deutscher Bundestag (2010). 9 
The intra-German adjustment to the unification shock based on high wage levels and public 
debt can be seen as the starting point for the divergence of intra-European current account 
balances. The 1:1 German monetary union combined with the real effective appreciation of 
the German mark (Figure 4) and low productivity of the industries in the eastern part of the 
country had eroded the international competitiveness of unified Germany. During the post-
unification recession, unemployment rocketed, in particular in the eastern part where most 
state-owned enterprises went bankrupt following the sudden real wage hikes, which were not 
backed by respective productivity increases. The East German unemployment rate jumped 
from virtually zero in 1990 to 10 percent in 1991 and reached almost 20 percent in 1997. The 
unemployment rate of unified Germany was dragged to unknown peaks, from about seven 
percent in 1990 to more than 12 percent in 1998.  
 
German public debt had increased sharply during the unification process (Figure 5) from 41 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 60 percent in 1998.  During the second half of the 1990s, the 
advent of the European monetary union and the stability and growth pact enhanced the need 
for fiscal consolidation. The hike in both unemployment and public debt drastically reduced 
the bargaining power of trade unions. The consolidation of public budgets seemed even more 
necessary in the face of the stability and growth pact, which Germany itself had initiated and 
now seemed to be unable to comply with. To reduce public spending public wage growth was 
kept very moderate. Private sector wages were not only constrained by public wage austerity 
but  also  by  high  unemployment  figures  and  the  integration  of  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries into the European Union. As a result, overall German real wage growth 
remained very moderate. The resulting gloomy business sentiment put a drag on domestic 
investment,  which  made  –  in  the  context  of  global  financial  exuberance  –  investment  in 
foreign government bonds look very attractive (Sinn 2010). 
 
Due to rising productivity, unit labour costs have not significantly increased since 1995, and 
have strongly declined versus other EU members as suggested by Figure 4. A lasting trend of 
real depreciation of the German mark set in, which was mainly perpetuated by a gradual 
relative decline in unit labour costs. This trend continued after the German mark had been 
converted into the euro and the German current account returned to unprecedented surpluses 
(Fig. 8), while Germany’s neighbours generated rising deficits. Thus, the distortions caused 
by the adjustment to the German unification based on public debt and high wages constituted 10 
the  origin  for  the  divergence  of  intra-European  current  accounts  since  the  late  1990s,  as 
Germany sought to regain its competitiveness.  
 
4. Long-Term Consequences for the Euro Area 
 
The introduction of the euro further promoted the divergence of current account balances in 
the  European  Monetary  Union  as  shown  in  Figure  1  and  Figure  8.  Although  a  common 
monetary policy was implemented and euro area money and capital markets became (more) 
integrated, differences in wage growth remained in place. In Germany, overall wage growth 
remained moderate as a legacy of the post-unification distortions, which were perceived as 
urgent to be addressed. In contrast, wage growth in many other countries of the euro area 
remained high, as the result of the inflation indexation of wages and high public sector wage 
growth (Zemanek 2010a).  
 
High wage growth at the E(M)U periphery became possible because of private and public 
austerity  in  Germany,  which  slowed  German  domestic  investment  and  led  to  immense 
German current account surpluses and net capital exports (Figure 1 and 2). After the net 
international investment position of Germany had declined close to zero in 1998, with the 
start of EMU, Germany’s net international assets dramatically increased to more than 900 
billion euros by 2009 (Figure 2). Gros (2010), who refers to the current crisis as “the long 
shadow of the fall of the wall”, argues that the worldwide credit boom since 2003 has made 
the euro crisis possible: The rise of intra-European current account imbalances was promoted 
by low interest rate policy in the US after the bust of the new economy bubble which was 
translated into a (rather) low interest rate policy in the euro area (Schnabl and Freitag 2010).  
 
German  net  savings  were  funnelled  via  integrated  capital  markets  inter  alia  to  southern, 
central  and  eastern  Europe.  The  elimination  of  the  exchange  rate  risk  and  the  common 
monetary  policy  as  conducted  by  the  ECB,  improved  macroeconomic  conditions  and 
therefore credit conditions in former high inflation countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Bulgaria  and  Hungary.  Lower  borrowing  constraints  as  a  result  of  financial  deepening 
accelerated southward, eastward and westward capital flows. The EMU and EU membership 
seemed to have nourished the notion of enhanced international capital allocation efficiency 
and international risk sharing. 
 11 
The common monetary policy of the European Central Bank was not able to steer against 
rising wages and inflation at the E(M)U periphery as German low wage and price growth kept 
average euro area inflation close to its target. Given that capital flows were unidirectional 
instead of mutual (and therefore wage policies in the EMU diverged), the one-size-monetary 
policy of the EMU led to a divergence of real interest rates, which further fuelled asymmetric 
economic development. The nominal differences in wage and price inflation translated into 
real divergences. The Germany mark gradually depreciated against all other euro area and EU 
currencies  as  shown  in  Figure  3  and  Figure  4.  Current  accounts  continued  to  diverge 
(Zemanek et al. 2010) as shown in Figure 8.  
 
In later papers – in a “plan for a common currency” – Mundell (1973a, 1973b) argued that a 
higher degree of capital market integration in a monetary union helps to absorb asymmetric 
shocks via cross-country financial asset holdings
4 (McKinnon 2003). Applied to the European 
Monetary Union, Mundell (1973a, 1973b) implies that Germany would have increased its 
assets in Greece and Greece would have increased its assets in Germany after both countries 
had entered the monetary union. With each country holding claims on output of the other, 
asymmetric  shocks  or  adverse  business  cycles  are  shared  by  varying  capital  income  and 
capital valuation. This international risk sharing mechanism should have helped to absorb 
asymmetric shocks and to smooth consumption over time.  
 
However, in contrast to Mundell (1973a, 1973b), the capital market integration process in the 
European Monetary Union was de facto not a mutual one. Capital flows were unidirectional, 
in particular German capital flowing to southern and western Europe as well as – via Austria 
–  to Central and Eastern European countries. In contrast, very little capital seems to have 
moved in the opposite direction. In effect, integrated capital markets allowed – fuelled by the 
global credit boom – the current account balances to diverge as shown in Figure 8. Because of 
the resulting asymmetric distribution of risk, instead of risk sharing, capital markets further 






                                                 
4 Bonds, equities as well as bank credits. 12 



























France, Greece, Italy, Portuagal, Spain and Ireland
France, Greece, Italy, Portuagal, Spain, Irland, and CEE
 
Source:  IMF.  CEE  countries  are  Czech  Republic,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
 
Apparently, during the crisis, market participants and lenders seem to have interpreted all 
countries  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  as  being  jointly  liable  for  a  single  member 
countries’ debt. Markets seem to have ignored the European Treaty, which explicitly excludes  
bail outs for the euro area (Article 125 EU Treaty). The Greek government, Greek banks and 
German banks seem to have anticipated supranational support (or bail out), because on a 
global level past balance of payment crises had been mostly monetarized by rising public debt 
in combination with interest rates cuts (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2009).
5 Thus, moral hazard is 
likely to have inflated the dimension of the current crisis. That might particularly be true as 
the shock did not appear suddenly and exogenously as modelled by Mundell (1961), but the 
crisis potential was gradually built up by diverging current accounts and rising intra-euro area 
liabilities (Zemanek 2001a, Zemanek et al. 2010). 
 
Although it remains unclear, who will pay for the costs of the European debt crisis, West 
German savers and taxpayers bear an over-proportional risk, if the fast rising European public 
debt burden will be worked off by raising taxes or inflation. West German tax payers wonder, 
                                                 
5 Hoffmann and Schnabl (2009) argue that asymmetric interest rate cuts – i.e. larger interest rate cuts during the 
crisis than interest rate increases during the recovery – have hidden the cost of crisis resolution and have 
contributed to a fall of the global interest rate level towards zero. 13 
if Greece will follow the East German example, with adjustment costs being born on a supra-
national level by taxpayers and with net transfers becoming even more persistent than in the 
case of East Germany. The stake which is at risk can be quantified to be a substantial part of 
Germany`s net international assets as shown in Fig. 2, i.e. a sum up to 900 billion euros, 
which comes close to the total cost of the German unification. The process of devaluing 
German international savings would be accelerated in the case of default of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain or others. If the European Central Bank responds to the threat of default of 
EMU and/or EU members with monetary expansion, the devaluation of savings will take 
place via higher inflation or new boom-and-bust cycles. In all cases, inter-temporal allocation 
would be turned into intra-European redistribution.   
 
 
5. Economic Policy Implications: Towards an Even More Monetary Expansion? 
 
The  adjustment  mechanisms  of  asymmetric  shocks  in  the  European  Monetary  Union  are 
complex  and  go  beyond  Mundell  (1961)  and  Mundell  (1973a,  1973b).  Because  financial 
markets tend to regard country specific liabilities as union wide liabilities, it is more likely 
that asymmetric shocks in the E(M)U are absorbed by rising public debt or inflation. The 
German unification as well as the European debt crisis, which was sparked by the Greek 
tragedy  and  the  most  recent  Irish  dilemma,  have  increased  and  will  increase  public  debt 
throughout Europe. When public debt in Europe threatens to reach unsustainable limits, at the 
latest  during  a  new  round  of  crisis,  debt  reduction  by  increasing  inflation  becomes  more 
likely.  
 
Inter-temporal saving will not pay off if public debt and/or inflation are used to prevent credit 
defaults during crisis. From this point of view, the proposal by the French Minister Lagarde to 
increase wages and private consumption in Germany can be seen to be in the very interest of 
German savers and taxpayers. The declining German current account surplus would reduce 
potential  future  credit  risk  for  Germany  in  general  and  German  savers  and  taxpayers  in 
specific. However, it is not clear how a declining current account surplus can be achieved by 
economic policy action for three reasons. First, German wages are negotiated by enterprises 
and trade unions without political interference. Even if France demands higher German wages 
the German government has only limited scope to encourage private sector wage increases. 
Generous public wage increases are likely to encourage higher private sector wages, but they 14 
are  constraint  by  the  stability  and  growth  pact,  which  seems  to  have  become  even  more 
binding after the most recent crisis.  
 
Second, the German current account surplus may shrink, if German savers anticipate further 
defaults of German international savings. If this were the case, savings would be invested at 
home,  for  instance  in  the  real  estate  sector,  where  prices  are  cheap  from  a  European 
perspective and therefore have already picked up. Yet, the German real estate sector may not 
be large enough to absorb all German savings. Third, even if wages in Germany rise, it is not 
certain, whether Germans will translate higher wages into more domestic demand. If Germans 
stick to their saving habit while wages rise, the current account surplus would further grow. A 
huge  public  investment  program  like  after  the  unification  would  be  necessary  to  redirect 
German  capital  towards  domestic  investment.  As  the  marginal  efficiency  of  public 
investments is in general below private investments and decreasing over time, a large scale 
Keynesian investment program may not be a desirable option. 
  
But, unintended repercussions on the whole of Europe are likely when the German current 
account turns negative. As during the unification boom, rising real interest rates, slowing 
growth and increasing unemployment throughout Europe may be the consequence. This is not 
the scenario, which Madame Lagarde has in mind. Therefore, she may want to consider the 
backlash of her idea. Unless, she has already anticipated that the reversal of German capital 
flows  will  trigger  a  new  crisis  in  fragile  countries  such  as  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain  and  in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Then, the threat of a new crisis will be the catalyst for even 
further monetary expansion by the ECB. That could be equivalent to a move from a German-
type  “hardnosed”  central  bank  to  a  more  inflation-benign  central  bank  as  it  prevailed  in 
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